Перейти к содержимому
Nawras Bukhari
Написать
Работы
UAV / SecurityПубличное анонимизированное

UAV telemetry and field systems

CybersecurityInfrastructure & DevOpsAI / Computer VisionBackend Engineering

Resilient telemetry, edge inference, and control-path security

Architecture, telemetry, and security engineering

Контекст

UAV telemetry and command paths fail in ways that look like “the radio is fine.” Spoofed identifiers, delayed packets, and unverified control messages are architecture problems, not UI problems.

Граница системы

В системе

  • vehicle sensors
  • transport
  • ground ingestion
  • validation
  • time-series store
  • operator control

Вне системы

airframe design

Архитектура

The vehicle is untrusted relative to the ground station. Telemetry is authenticated and validated before it is stored. Control is a separate path with a tighter trust boundary than observation.

Field architecture for unmanned systems: vehicle telemetry, transport, validation, persistence, and a monitored control surface with explicit trust boundaries.
  1. Vehicle
  2. Transport
  3. Ingestion
  4. Validation
  5. Persistence
  6. Monitor / control
  • Dashed = trust boundary
  • Control is a separate path
Опубликованная последовательность
  1. Vehicle
  2. Transport
  3. Ingestion
  4. Validation
  5. Persistence
  6. Monitor / control
Этапы в каждом ряду
  • Ряд 13Vehicle · Ingestion · Persistence
  • Ряд 23Transport · Validation · Monitor / control
Роли на схеме
  • внешний1
  • сервис1
  • процесс1
  • хранилище1
  • интерфейс2

Счётчики из опубликованной записи. Они описывают структуру, а не измеренный результат.

Что пересекает границу доверия?

Untrusted field

  • внешнийVehicle

transit

  • интерфейсTransport

Ground trust

  • сервисIngestion
  • процессValidation
  • хранилищеPersistence

Control plane

  • интерфейсMonitor / control
  1. VehicleTransport
  2. TransportIngestion
  3. IngestionValidation
  4. ValidationPersistence
  5. PersistenceMonitor / control

Критические потоки

  1. Vehicle emits telemetry

  2. transport (NATS/MAVLink-class)

  3. ingestion

  4. schema and anomaly validation

  5. Timescale persistence

  6. observe/control surfaces. Command traffic does not share the telemetry write path.

Этапы

  • Telemetry ingest
  • Trust boundaries
  • Time-series store
  • Edge inference
  • Control policy

Решения

01

Separate observe and command

A compromised telemetry writer must not become a command issuer. Boundaries are in the topology, not in comments.

02

Validate before persist

Storage is not a dump. Identifier, clock, and envelope checks happen on the way in.

03

Edge inference is a peer, not a plugin

EO/IR models run at the edge with their own health, not as a side effect of the GCS UI.

Когда что-то ломается

УсловиеОбнаружениеРеакция
Identity or envelope violationIngest validatorDrop; increment security counter; do not store
Clock skew / replayMonotonic timestamp windowQuarantine stream; alert control
Transport partitionHeartbeat lossHold last validated state; freeze command unless policy allows
Store write failureCommit errorLocal WAL on ingest; backfill when store returns

Инфраструктура

  • Field radio
  • NATS
  • ingest services
  • TimescaleDB
  • edge GPU/CPU
  • ground control host
  • audit log

Результат

A field topology where telemetry can be distrusted, validated, and stored without collapsing into a single “GCS application.”

Текущее состояние

Active field architecture. Security and telemetry research continues against this topology.