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الأعمال
UAV / Securityعام مجهول

UAV telemetry and field systems

CybersecurityInfrastructure & DevOpsAI / Computer VisionBackend Engineering

Resilient telemetry, edge inference, and control-path security

Architecture, telemetry, and security engineering

السياق

UAV telemetry and command paths fail in ways that look like “the radio is fine.” Spoofed identifiers, delayed packets, and unverified control messages are architecture problems, not UI problems.

حدود النظام

ضمن النطاق

  • vehicle sensors
  • transport
  • ground ingestion
  • validation
  • time-series store
  • operator control

خارج النطاق

airframe design

البنية

The vehicle is untrusted relative to the ground station. Telemetry is authenticated and validated before it is stored. Control is a separate path with a tighter trust boundary than observation.

Field architecture for unmanned systems: vehicle telemetry, transport, validation, persistence, and a monitored control surface with explicit trust boundaries.
  1. Vehicle
  2. Transport
  3. Ingestion
  4. Validation
  5. Persistence
  6. Monitor / control
  • Dashed = trust boundary
  • Control is a separate path
التسلسل المنشور
  1. Vehicle
  2. Transport
  3. Ingestion
  4. Validation
  5. Persistence
  6. Monitor / control
المراحل في كل صف
  • الصف 13Vehicle · Ingestion · Persistence
  • الصف 23Transport · Validation · Monitor / control
الأدوار في المخطط
  • خارجي1
  • خدمة1
  • عملية1
  • مخزن1
  • واجهة2

أعداد من السجل المنشور. تصف البنية، وليست نتيجة مقاسة.

ما الذي يعبر حدود الثقة؟

Untrusted field

  • خارجيVehicle

transit

  • واجهةTransport

Ground trust

  • خدمةIngestion
  • عمليةValidation
  • مخزنPersistence

Control plane

  • واجهةMonitor / control
  1. VehicleTransport
  2. TransportIngestion
  3. IngestionValidation
  4. ValidationPersistence
  5. PersistenceMonitor / control

التدفقات الحرجة

  1. Vehicle emits telemetry

  2. transport (NATS/MAVLink-class)

  3. ingestion

  4. schema and anomaly validation

  5. Timescale persistence

  6. observe/control surfaces. Command traffic does not share the telemetry write path.

المراحل

  • Telemetry ingest
  • Trust boundaries
  • Time-series store
  • Edge inference
  • Control policy

القرارات

01

Separate observe and command

A compromised telemetry writer must not become a command issuer. Boundaries are in the topology, not in comments.

02

Validate before persist

Storage is not a dump. Identifier, clock, and envelope checks happen on the way in.

03

Edge inference is a peer, not a plugin

EO/IR models run at the edge with their own health, not as a side effect of the GCS UI.

عندما يتعطل

الحالةالكشفالاستجابة
Identity or envelope violationIngest validatorDrop; increment security counter; do not store
Clock skew / replayMonotonic timestamp windowQuarantine stream; alert control
Transport partitionHeartbeat lossHold last validated state; freeze command unless policy allows
Store write failureCommit errorLocal WAL on ingest; backfill when store returns

البنية التحتية

  • Field radio
  • NATS
  • ingest services
  • TimescaleDB
  • edge GPU/CPU
  • ground control host
  • audit log

النتيجة

A field topology where telemetry can be distrusted, validated, and stored without collapsing into a single “GCS application.”

الحالة الحالية

Active field architecture. Security and telemetry research continues against this topology.

  • NATS
  • TimescaleDB
  • Rust
  • Python
  • EO/IR
  • Edge inference
  • MAVLink
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